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SHORT-TIME COMPENSATION: IS 
GERMANY’S SUCCESS WITH KURZARBEIT 
AN ANSWER TO U.S. UNEMPLOYMENT? 
Megan Felter* 
Abstract: The recent financial crisis caused a global recession that af-
fected the economies of both the United States and Germany. While the 
ranks of jobless workers expanded in the U.S. and unemployment remain 
high, Germany’s labor market was less affected by the recession because 
of its success with Kurzarbeit, a work sharing program. Germany’s experi-
ence with Kurzarbeit can provide the United States with useful insights to 
improve its own version of work sharing—short-time compensation—to 
better combat unemployment. 
Introduction 
 Unemployment rates soared throughout the world during the 
2008–2009 economic crisis.1 The United States and Germany were vul-
nerable to the recession’s impact; both countries’ economies experi-
enced significant downturns.2 Germany contained its unemployment 
problem more successfully, however, with Kurzarbeit, a work sharing pro-
gram.3 The program has garnered international attention because it 
allows the government to supplement workers’ income during tempo-
rary periods of decreased demand.4 Because the German program al-
                                                                                                                      
 
* Megan Felter is the Executive Note Editor of the Boston College International & Com-
parative Law Review. She would like to thank Professor Thomas C. Kohler for his guidance, 
and Noah Hampson and Lauren Campbell for their editorial assistance. 
1 See Int’l Labour Org. [ILO], G20 Labour and Employment Ministers Meeting, Wash-
ington, D.C., Apr. 20–21, 2010, Employment and Social Protection Policies from Crisis to Recovery 
and Beyond: A Review of Experience, at 15–16 (Apr. 2010) [hereinafter Crisis to Recovery], available 
at http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/jobcrisis/download/g20_report_employment_and_ 
social_protection_policies.pdf. 
2 See Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Employment Outlook 2010—How Does 
Germany Compare?, at 1 (2010) [hereinafter Employment Outlook: Germany], available at http:// 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/51/45603327.pdf; OECD, Employment Outlook 2010—How Does 
the United States Compare?, at 1–2 (2010) [hereinafter Employment Outlook: U.S.], available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/57/45603148.pdf. 
3 See Employment Outlook: Germany, supra note 2, at 1. 
4 Andreas Crimmann et al., The German Work-Sharing Scheme: An Instrument for the Crisis 
13 (ILO Conditions of Work & Emp. Series No. 25, 2010). See generally Nicholas Kulish, 
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lows individuals to remain employed and receive a sufficient income 
while working fewer hours, widespread application of a similar frame-
work in the United States could prove useful in managing unemploy-
ment rates.5 
 Part I of this Note describes U.S. and German responses to the re-
cession’s impact on unemployment rates, focusing on Germany’s suc-
cess with work sharing and noting the existence of similar short-time 
compensation (STC) programs in the United States. Part II juxtaposes 
the success of Kurzarbeit in Germany against the underutilization of STC 
programs in the United States, and explores why U.S. work sharing pro-
grams have not achieved their full potential. Part III considers strategies, 
informed by Germany’s experience with work sharing, to increase the 
United States’ use of STC programs to combat unemployment. 
I. Background 
A. The Recession’s Impact on the United States and Germany 
 Many countries’ unemployment rates soared during and after the 
2008–09 recession.6 In the United States, the unemployment rate dou-
bled, rising from 5% to 10% during this two year period.7 By mid-2009, 
U.S. workers filed a record 6.8 million unemployment claims.8 Making 
matters worse, many of those filing claims faced unemployment for ex-
tended periods.9 There is a growing concern that such long-term un-
employment will leave some workers destitute and perpetually ex-
cluded from the job market.10 In fact, in January 2012, almost 43% of 
jobless Americans were considered “long-term unemployed,” having 
been out of work for at least twenty-seven weeks.11 Because the econ-
omy’s slow recovery has done little to prompt employers to hire more 
                                                                                                                      
Defying Others, Germany Finds Economic Success, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 2010, at A1 (describing 
Germany’s success with Kurzarbeit). 
5 See Alison M. Shelton, Cong. Research Serv., R 40689, Compensated Work 
Sharing Arrangements (Short-Time Compensation) as an Alternative to Layoffs 
6–10, 14–16 (2010). 
6 See Crisis to Recovery, supra note 1, at 15–16. 
7 Employment Outlook: U.S., supra note 2, at 1. 
8 Crisis to Recovery, supra note 1, at 16. 
9 Employment Outlook: U.S., supra note 2, at 1. 
10 Id. 
11 Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, USDL-12-0163, The Employ-
ment Situation—January 2012, at 2 (2012). 
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workers,12 the unemployment rate has remained above 8% for three 
years.13 
 The recession battered Germany’s economy to an even greater 
extent.14 Germany’s gross domestic product (GDP) decreased by al-
most 7%— “a much stronger decline of GDP” than many other ad-
vanced and emerging countries experienced.15 As a major exporting 
country, Germany was particularly vulnerable to the recession in its ser-
vice and manufacturing industries.16 Nonetheless, Germany avoided 
the significant increase in unemployment rates that the United States 
and many other countries experienced.17 While the U.S. unemploy-
ment rate jumped from 5.8% in 2008 to 10% in 2009, Germany’s un-
employment rate remained relatively stable at approximately 7%, in-
creasing by only .4% during the same period.18 
                                                                                                                     
B. Kurzarbeit: Germany’s Work Sharing Program 
 Kurzarbeit, meaning “short work,” is a government program that 
allows workers facing reduced hours due to temporary instances of de-
creased demand to keep their jobs and receive government funds to 
partially supplement their diminished income.19 Kurzarbeit exemplifies 
 
 
12 See Employment Outlook: U.S., supra note 2, at 2. 
13 Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey: Unemployment Rate, Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000 (last visited May. 18, 2012) 
(providing monthly unemployment rates from February 2009 to March 2012). Notably, the 
unemployment rate does not take into account “discouraged workers,” those individuals who 
have stopped looking for work because they believe no jobs are available for them.” Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, supra note 11, at Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ). Thus, in January 
2012, over one million “discouraged workers” were not included in the unemployment rate. 
Id. at 2 & FAQ. 
14 See Crimmann et al., supra note 4, at 5; Employment Outlook: Germany, supra note 2, at 
1. 
15 Crimmann et al., supra note 4, at 5; Employment Outlook: Germany, supra note 2, at 1; 
Members and Partners, OECD, http://www.oecd.org (click on “About” tab; then click on 
“Membership”) (last visited May 18, 2012). 
16 Crimmann et al., supra note 4, at 5, 18. In Germany, the recession “gave rise to sharp 
declines in orders and to considerable liquidity shortages.” ILO, Global Wage Report 2010/11: 
Wage Policies in Times of Crisis, at 58 (2010) [hereinafter Global Wage Report], available at 
www.ilo.org (click on “Publications” tab; then click on “Global Wage Report 2010/11”) (last 
visited May 18, 2012). 
17 Employment Outlook: Germany, supra note 2, at 1. 
18 Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, supra note 13; Crimmann et al., 
supra note 4, at 4. 
19 Short-Time Work or “Kurzarbeit”: Frequently Asked Questions, German Missions in the 
U.S., http://www.germany.info (search “Kurzarbeit”; then follow “Short-Time Work or 
‘Kurzarbeit’: Frequently Asked Questions” hyperlink) (last visited May 18, 2012); Crim-
mann et al., supra note 4, at 13. Although two other types of work sharing are available in 
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work sharing programs found worldwide, in countries such as France, 
Italy, Japan, Korea, and the Netherlands.20 Used in Germany during 
the Weimar Republic, work sharing spread to many industrial countries 
following World War II.21 Work sharing is an expansive term that refers 
to “any arrangement under which a firm chooses to reduce work hours 
across the board for many or all workers instead of permanently laying 
off a smaller number of workers.”22 Countries differ in their level of 
work sharing participation; in some places, participation is in the mil-
lions, while in others, participation is only in the tens of thousands.23 
During the recession, countries that updated and extended their pro-
grams found work sharing valuable in combating unemployment.24 
 Germany’s program has a long and robust history.25 A work shar-
ing scheme was first used by German miners as early as 1910.26 It flour-
ished under the Weimar Republic in the 1920s, and by 1969, the pro-
gram was “reaffirmed in the country’s . . . employment promotion 
law.”27 In the 1990s, work sharing was used to temper job loss during 
reunification and to respond to a struggling auto industry.28 
 To keep workers employed during the recent recession, Germany 
used its Kurzarbeit program on an unprecedented scale.29 In mid-2009, 
over 1.4 million workers and 63,000 employers participated in the pro-
gram.30 The “largest work sharing program[] in the world,” Kurzarbeit 
                                                                                                                      
Germany to address “seasonal short-time work” and “permanent loss of employment,” this 
Note focuses solely on the operation of work sharing programs in response to economic 
downturns causing short-term job loss. See Crimmann et al., supra note 4, at 13. 
20 See Crimmann et al., supra note 4, at 32. 
21 Stephen A. Wandner, Employment Programs for Unemployment Insurance Recipients, 
Monthly Lab. Rev., Oct. 2008, at 17, 20. 
22 Shelton, supra note 5, at 1–2. Work sharing is not the same as job sharing, “where 
two persons actually share one job.” Crimmann et al., supra note 4, at 1. 
23 See Crisis to Recovery, supra note 1, at 32. 
24 See id. at 35; Employment Outlook: U.S., supra note 2, at 2. 
25 See Crimmann et al., supra note 4, at 17; ILO, G20 Labour and Employment Ministers 
Meeting, Washington, D.C., Apr. 20–21, 2010, Germany’s Response to the Crisis, at 2 (Apr. 2010) 
[hereinafter Germany’s Response], available at http://www.dol.gov/ilab/media/events/G20_ 
ministersmeeting/G20-germany-brief.pdf; Wandner, supra note 21, at 20; Wayne Vroman & 
Vera Brusentsev, Short-Time Compensation as a Policy to Stabilize Employment 1 (Urban Inst., Re-
search Paper, 2009), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/411983_stabilize_em 
ployment.pdf. 
26 Germany’s Response, supra note 25, at 2. 
27 Id.; Wandner, supra note 21, at 20. 
28 Crimmann et al., supra note 4, at 17. 
29 See Crisis to Recovery, supra note 1, at iii; Germany’s Response, supra note 25, at 2; Vro-
man & Brusentsev, supra note 25, at 11–14. 
30 Crisis to Recovery, supra note 1, at 32, 36. 
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cost the German government an estimated €5 billion but saved more 
than 200,000 jobs by the latter half of 2009.31 
 Under Kurzarbeit, employees working reduced hours receive a 
“short-time allowance” of 60% of their former full-time wages, or 67% if 
they have a child.32 Workers receive the short-time allowance from their 
employers.33 In turn, the employers submit monthly accounts to the 
government and are reimbursed for the funds paid in excess of the 
workers’ net hourly compensation.34 Vacation and holiday pay, how-
ever, remain the employers’ responsibility.35 Employers must also make 
social insurance contributions, although provisions limited the contri-
butions for lost hours to 80% of normal contribution payments.36 The 
government does, however, reimburse the employer for half of these 
payments during the first six months, and after six months, the gov-
ernment is responsible for the full amount of social insurance contribu-
onsti .37 
 Employers of any size and in any industry can participate in Kurzar-
beit38 so long as there has been a reduction in available work “for eco-
nomic reasons or . . . an unavoidable event” that other labor measures 
cannot adequately address.39 The decrease in work must be temporary, 
and return to normal working time must be anticipated within a year 
                                                                                                                      
31 Crimmann et al., supra note 4, at iii, 1; Employment Outlook: Germany, supra note 2, at 
1. Other sources suggest that up to 432,000 jobs were saved. See Crisis to Recovery, supra note 
1, at 36; see also Short-Time Work or “Kurzarbeit,” supra note 19 (estimating that “400,000 jobs 
have been saved”). Although this Note focuses solely on the significant role Kurzarbeit 
played in controlling Germany’s unemployment rate, Germany’s use of working-time ac-
counts, its lack of a real estate and credit bubble burst, and its role as an exporter, particu-
larly
ote 4, at 14. If a participating 
emp lowance equal to un-
emp fits. Crimmann et al., supra note 4, at 13. 
istry of Labour & Soc. Affairs, supra note 32, at 4. 
t 7. 
ers, “a graphic arts agency employing five persons, the 
auto
, at 8; see Crimmann et al., 
supr
 to China, may also have affected the country’s job market. See Crimmann et al., supra 
note 4, at 1, 5–6; Angela in Wunderland, Economist, Feb. 5–11, 2011, at 17. 
32 Fed. Ministry of Labour & Soc. Affairs, Working Short-Time to Overcome 
the Crisis 4 (Mar. 2010) (Ger.); Crimmann et al., supra n
loyee’s hours drop to zero, the employee receives a short-time al
loyment bene
33 Fed. Min
34 Id. at 4, 9. 
35 Id. a
36 Id. at 5, 7. 
37 Id. 
38 Short-Time Work or “Kurzarbeit,” supra note 19. Germany promotes the program as 
useful to a wide variety of employ
motive supplier encompassing 500 employees, or the construction conglomerate with 
50,000 workers on its payroll.” Id. 
39 Fed. Ministry of Labour & Soc. Affairs, supra note 32
a note 4, at 1, 6 (describing additional labor strategies, such as “working-time ac-
counts,” which may have also bolstered German employment). 
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and a half.40 Due to the recession’s persistence, however, Germany in-
creased the entitlement period to two years.41 Temporary or contract 
ust obtain approval from all employees fal-
ling under the program.46 
                                                                                                                     
workers also gained program eligibility because of the recession.42 
 To enroll, the employer or works council must notify the local em-
ployment agency that the wages of a minimum of one-third of workers 
would be reduced by more than ten percent for an estimated time pe-
riod.43 The local employment agency, and the employer’s own workers, 
must approve the program.44 If the business has a works council—a 
non-union body that employees may establish at companies that satisfy 
certain criteria—that council can provide employee consent.45 If there 
are no works councils and no union agreements applicable to short-
time work, the employer m
C. Work Sharing and Unemployment Benefits in the United States 
 Because U.S. employers laid off workers during the 2008–2009 
economic crisis, the government response was largely focused on pro-
viding and expanding unemployment benefits.47 State and federal gov-
ernments spent more than $115 billion on unemployment compensa-
tion in 2009.48 Under the Emergency Unemployment Compensation 
and Extended Benefit programs, the U.S. government increased the 
benefits collection period from twenty-six weeks to as much as ninety-
 
40 Fed. Ministry of Labour & Soc. Affairs, supra note 32, at 8. The eligibility period 
orig supra note 16, at 56. 
t 6; see Crimmann et al., 
supr
by more than ten percent. Fed. Ministry of Labour 
& S
ry of Labour & Soc. Affairs, supra note 32, at 8; Crimmann et al., su-
pra 
chmidt, Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Germany 223–24 (4th 
ed. 
ypolicyassociates.com/index.php/work_project555 (click on “PDF”) 
(sub
inally lasted only six months. Global Wage Report, 
41 Short-Time Work or “Kurzarbeit,” supra note 19. 
42 Fed. Ministry of Labour & Soc. Affairs, supra note 32, a
a note 4, at 15 (outlining additional Kurzarbeit requirements). 
43 Fed. Ministry of Labour & Soc. Affairs, supra note 32, at 8; Crimmann et al., su-
pra note 4, at 13, 15. After February 2009, employers had only to prove that the wages of at 
least one worker would be reduced 
oc. Affairs, supra note 32, at 5. 
44 Fed. Minist
note 4, at 13. 
45 Fed. Ministry of Labour & Soc. Affairs, supra note 32, at 8; Manfred Weiss & 
Marlene S
2008). 
46 Fed. Ministry of Labour & Soc. Affairs, supra note 32, at 8. 
47 See Katelin P. Isaacs et al., Cong. Research Serv., RL 34251, Federal Programs 
Available to Unemployed Workers 2 (2010); Crisis to Recovery, supra note 1, at 20–22; 
Stephen Walsh et al., Berkeley Planning Assocs., Evaluation of Short-Time Com-
pensation Programs: Final Report at 3-5 (1997) [hereinafter Final Report], available 
at http://www.berkele
mitted to DOL). 
48 See Isaacs et al., supra note 47, at 2. 
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nine weeks.49 Unfortunately, millions of jobless Americans depleted 
their ninety-nine weeks of benefits in 2011, leaving them without any 
ork
 
ate
ization 
 d
     
w ing income or further unemployment compensation.50 
 Work sharing is a concept that already exists in the United States, 
and has been recognized as a means “of spreading employment” and 
avoiding job losses during difficult economic times, including during 
the Great Depression.51 Twenty-three states currently offer work shar-
ing programs, known as STC programs.52 Five of those states author-
ized STC use within the past three years.53 Nonetheless, STC plans to-
taled only 2% of unemployment benefits paid out across the United
St s in 200954 and saved less than 300,000 jobs in 2009 and 2010 
combined.55 
 U.S. employers, employees, and states began calling for STC pro-
grams after a recession in the early 1970s.56 California instituted the 
first U.S. STC program in 1978, followed soon after by Arizona and Or-
egon.57 Although at the time states did not have federal author
to raw upon their unemployment trust funds for STC benefits, the 
Department of Labor (DOL) did not object to such funding.58 
 In 1982, the federal government enacted the Tax Equity and Fiscal 
Responsibility Act (TEFRA), which authorized a three-year federal STC 
                                                                                                                 
49 Isaacs et al., supra note 47, at 1; Crisis to Recovery, supra note 1, at 20–22. 
50 See Cold Comfort, Economist, Nov. 13–19, 2010, at 32; Growth Figures: Six Years into a 
Lost Decade, Economist, Aug. 6, 2011, at 28. Columnist David Leonhardt provides an apt 
description of the current state of affairs in the United States by stating that “for Corporate 
Ame
ote 5, at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting William J. 
Bar
yland, 
Mas
ase, supra. 
ffs Gains Traction, CLASP ( July 8, 2011), http:// 
www s?type=employment_strategies&id=0025. 
y. 
57 Final Report, supra note 47, at 3-2. The New York state legislature was actually the 
first
rica, the Great Recession is over. For the American work force, it’s not.” See David 
Leonhardt, In Wreckage of Lost Jobs, Lost Power, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 2011, at B1. 
51 Shelton, supra n
rett, The President’s Org. on Unemp. Relief, Spreading Work: Methods and 
Plans in Use (1932)). 
52 Id.; Press Release, Senator Jack Reed, Reed Calls for New National Plan to Help Save 
American Jobs ( July 6, 2011), available at http://www.reed.senate.gov/press/release/reed-
calls-for-new-national-plan-to-help-save-american-jobs. The states include: Arizona, Arkan-
sas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Mar
sachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, and Washington. Press Rele
53 Neil Ridley, Program to Avert Layo
.clasp.org/issues/in_focu
54 Shelton, supra note 5, summar
55 Ridley, supra note 53. 
56 Shelton, supra note 5, at 11. 
 to consider STC in 1975; however, no legislation was passed. Shelton, supra note 5, at 
11. 
58 Shelton, supra note 5, at 11; see infra text accompanying note 73 (describing the 
structure and funding of the U.S. unemployment insurance scheme). 
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program allowing state governments to use their unemployment trust 
fund accounts to supply STC benefits.59 TEFRA also instructed DOL to 
issue model legislation, which was distributed in 1983 and became the 
framework for most states’ STC programs.60 Once TEFRA’s temporary 
th
 the federal law to 
ive
ste
                                                                                                                     
au orization terminated, however, DOL curtailed its STC endorse-
ment efforts.61 
 After a recession in the early 1990s, Congress permanently ap-
proved STC programs in the Unemployment Compensation Amend-
ments of 1992 (UCA).62 UCA, among other provisions, defined STC 
programs and required DOL to support the establishment of state pro-
grams, to create model legislation, and to issue a review of state pro-
grams.63 Although DOL collected information on STC programs, it did 
not fully satisfy UCA’s mandate.64 Efforts to amend
g  explicit approval of current state programs have been unsuccessful, 
including legislation that was introduced in 2009.65 
 STC programs all share a similar basic framework.66 State govern-
ments can authorize employer-specific proposals so long as hours are 
reduced by at least 10% and employers obtain union approval.67 Con-
si nt with the 50% of original earnings that unemployment compen-
sation offers, STC also provides half of an employee’s lost wages.68 
 
59 Shelton, supra note 5, at 11; see Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act, Pub. L. 
at the fed-
eral
 programs, and 
sum Final Report, supra note 47, at 8-10. 
 
§ 40 odified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
lton, supra note 5, at 12. 
 15–16. 
ar. 26, 2009), available at 
http ublications/files/0481.pdf. 
, supra note 5, at 2. 
No. 97-248, § 194, 96 Stat. 324, 409–11 (1982) (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) 
(providing for the temporary provision’s termination three years after enactment). Mo-
torola Corporation played an instrumental role in pushing for STC legislation 
 level, as it had done previously in Oregon. See Shelton, supra note 5, at 11. 
60 Shelton, supra note 5, at 11; David E. Balducchi & Stephen A. Wandner, Work Shar-
ing Policy: Power Sharing and Stalemate in American Federalism, 38 Publius: J. Federalism 111, 
121 (2008). The DOL’s STC Handbook, distributed in 1987, was particularly helpful to 
states implementing STC programs during this time, as it included “model language for 
state STC statutes, the text of legislation passed by states with existing STC
maries of STC research results.” 
61 Shelton, supra note 5, at 12. 
62 Id.; see Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-318,
1, 106 Stat. 290, 298–99 (1992) (c
63 She
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 13,
66 Id. at 2. 
67 Id. Employees participating in state STC programs usually work four days per week 
and receive STC benefits for the remaining day not worked. Neil Ridley, CLASP, Work 
Sharing—An Alternative to Layoffs for Tough Times 1 (M
://www.clasp.org/admin/site/p
68 Shelton
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 STC programs are funded in the same way as unemployment bene-
fits, taxing employers based upon an “experience rating.”69 As more 
benefits are collected by laid-off employees, the employer’s experience 
tin
eas an 
unemployed U.S. worker can usually receive unemployment benefits 
(including partial unemploy nly up to half of his or her 
normal wages, an employee working half of his or her normal hours 
can still rece m.73 
and more particularly 
states merely follow federal laws in these areas.76 
                                                                                                                     
ra g increases, requiring the employer to pay more unemployment 
insurance taxes.70 STC can be funded by the Unemployment Trust 
Fund because it is considered an unemployment compensation pro-
gram under the Social Security Act.71 
 STC programs are distinguished from partial unemployment ben-
efits, which are paid “to an unemployed worker who has accepted a 
part-time job while searching for a permanent, full-time job . . . . [and 
who is] earning less than their weekly benefit amount.”72 Wher
ment benefits) o
ive supplemental benefits under an STC progra
II. Discussion 
A. Legal Authorization for Work Sharing Programs 
 Germany’s work sharing program has enjoyed longstanding legal 
authorization, clear from its decades-old history 
its use during German reunification.74 Kurzarbeit maintains a unified 
legal framework because Germany’s federal government is the sole en-
tity responsible for labor and social security policy decisions.75 German 
 
69 Id. at 3. 
70 Vroman & Brusentsev, supra note 295, at 17 n.22. 
71 Wandner, supra note 21, at 21–22. The unemployment insurance program, which 
now encompasses traditional unemployment benefits as well as STC benefits, was estab-
lished in 1935 to provide financial support for the unemployed. Id. at 17. Federal law dic-
tates the program’s structure, in which “[e]ach state has an account within the Fund from 
which it pays [unemployment] benefits.” Id. at 17, 21. Though states are responsible for 
administering the unemployment insurance program, federal taxes finance the cost of 
program administration in the states. Unemployment Insurance Tax Topic, Dep’t of Labor, 
http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/uitaxtopic.asp (last visited May 18, 2012). 
Federal taxes also fund half of extended unemployment benefits and offer “a fund from 
which states may borrow, if necessary, to pay benefits.” Id. State taxes are used purely to pay 
unemployment benefits. Id. 
72 Shelton, supra note 5, at 3. 
73 Id. 
74 Crimmann et al., supra note 4, at 17; Germany’s Response, supra note 295, at 2; Wand-
ner, supra note 21, at 20; Vroman & Brusentsev, supra note 25, at 11. 
75 See Weiss & Schmidt, supra note 45, at 19. 
76 See id. 
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 In the United States, however, unemployment is addressed through 
a “federal-state partnership” that gives states the freedom to establish 
their own unemployment compensation programs so long as they meet 
iti
wing a recession.81 The statutory definition of STC pro-
gram rk-
week CA 
prov
eet availability for 
r their normal work week; 
n of STC is problematic, however, be-
cause it omits provisions contained in TEFRA—provisions that states 
     
in al federal requirements.77 Although U.S. STC programs have ex-
isted for a number of years, the federal government has not established 
a consistent legal framework to bolster program use by the states.78 
 The first instance of federal inconsistency regarding STC program 
authorization occurred after TEFRA’s three-year mandate expired and 
DOL stopped endorsing STC programs.79 Not only did established state 
programs still exist, but seven additional state programs were imple-
mented using the expired law’s model legislation.80 With the enact-
ment of UCA in 1992, the federal government again authorized STC 
programs follo
s under UCA renders them applicable when “individuals’ wo
s have been reduced by at least 10%.”82 During such periods, U
ides that 
STC is paid as a pro rata portion of the full unemployment 
benefit that an individual would have received if totally un-
employed; 
. . . STC beneficiaries are not required to m
work and work search requirements, unlike beneficiaries of 
regular unemployment compensation, but they are required 
to be available fo
. . . STC beneficiaries may participate in employer-sponsored 
training programs; and . . . the reduction in work hours is in 
lieu of layoffs.83 
UCA’s permanent authorizatio
                                                                                                                 
77 Dep’t of Labor, Office of Unemp. Ins., Unemployment Compensation: Fed-
eral-State Partnership 1 (2010) [hereinafter Federal-State Partnership], available at 
http employ/pdf/partnership.pdf. 
helton, supra note 5, at 12. 
(A), 
106 
tatutory 
pro ensation Amendments § 401(d)(1)(B)–(E). 
://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/un
78 See S
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 3–4, 12. 
82 Id. at 12 (restating UCA’s provisions). For the actual statutory provisions, see Un-
employment Compensation Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-318, § 401(d)(1)
Stat. 290, 298–99 (1992) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
83 Shelton, supra note 5, at 12 (restating UCA’s provisions). For the actual s
visions, see Unemployment Comp
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relie ro-
gram
elevant union(s); or contribute to 
                                                                                                                     
d upon when they initially crafted their still-existing STC p
s.84 Unlike TEFRA, UCA 
does not require employers to . . . submit work sharing plans 
to the state for approval; certify to the relevant state agency 
that the reduction in work hours is in lieu of temporary lay-
offs; win consent from the r
health insurance or pension plans as if the employee contin-
ued to be fully employed.85 
Because UCA’s provisions are inconsistent with TEFRA, a number of 
existing TEFRA-based state STC programs technically violate the more 
restrictive law currently in effect.86 If DOL enforced the federal law in 
its present form, it “would risk confrontations with work sharing states 
and likely bring the Congress back into a policy debate.”87 Conse-
uenq tly, DOL has “sidestepped implementation of STC” by failing to 
provide states with support and updated model legislation and refusing 
to contest state programs created in accordance with TEFRA.88 
 Congressional efforts to bolster UCA’s definition of STC with some 
of TEFRA’s original provisions have been unsuccessful.89 For example, 
on multiple occasions, Congress has failed to pass legislation giving 
states the ability to hold employers responsible for submitting STC plans 
to state agencies and providing full health and retirement benefits to 
90employees.  Nonetheless, the recent recession has renewed federal in-
terest in STC, as evidenced by the introduction of a number of different 
STC bills in 2009.91 
 The Keep Americans Working Act (KAWA) would have required 
employers to submit written STC plans to state agencies and to con-
tinue to provide employees with health and retirement benefits.92 It 
 
n, supra note 5, at 12. 
e-
quir i & Wandner, supra note 60, at 129. 
129. 
 note 5, at 12–13. 
. 
1830 .R. 5418, 107th Cong. (2002)). 
646, 111th Cong. (2009); Keep Americans Work-
ing g. (2009). 
84 Shelto
85 See id. 
86 See id. at 12–13 (“Clinton Administration and DOL officials were concerned that ex-
isting state provisions requiring employers to continue to provide health and pension ben-
efits were out of compliance with UCA’s definitions of STC, and DOL would need to r
e states to roll back these provisions.”); Balducch
87 Balducchi & Wandner, supra note 60, at 
88 Shelton, supra
89 See id. at 13. 
90 Id. (listing bills targeting STC as including H.R. 4040, 103d Cong. (1994); S. 1951, 
103d Cong. (1994); H.R. 1789, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 3697, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R
, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 2962, 107th Cong. (2001); H
91 See id. at 15; infra text accompanying notes 101–103 
92 Keep Americans Working Act, S. 1
Act, H.R. 4135, 111th Con
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also called upon DOL to support state STC programs and offer model 
legislation.93 Finally, KAWA would have authorized DOL to provide 
art
ursement period 
 LPA would mandate that employers sub-
                                                                                                                     
st -up grants to states with STC programs and declared that states 
would receive full reimbursement of STC benefit payments until Sep-
tember 30, 2011.94 
 The Helping Unemployed Workers Act (HUWA) included similar 
provisions, although it would have extended the reimb
through the end of 2011.95 Both acts died, however, after languishing 
in the Senate Finance Committee and the House Committee on Ways 
and Means during the 111th Congressional session.96 
 Despite these failures, politicians have continued to propose STC 
legislation because they recognize that “the deep recession . . . will not 
be solved overnight.”97 In July 2011, members of Congress introduced 
the Layoff Prevention Act (LPA).98 LPA mirrors provisions contained in 
2009’s KAWA and HUWA, as well as President Obama’s recently intro-
duced 2011 American Jobs Act, by proposing requirements consistent 
with TEFRA.99 For example,
mit their STC plans to the state and continue to provide health and 
retirement benefits.100 It would also require employers to obtain union 
approval of their STC plans.101 
 In addition to refining the contours of STC programs, LPA offers 
funding and support to enhance program implementation and use.102 
 
nem-
ploy
ck.us, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-2831 
(las
e 
Ame
us, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill. 
xpd
831; H.R. 4183; S. 1646; H.R. 4135; The American Jobs 
Act
). 
(1). 
93 S. 1646; H.R. 4135. 
94 S. 1646; H.R. 4135. 
95 Helping Unemployed Workers Act, S. 2831, 111th Cong. (2009); Helping U
ed Workers Act, H.R. 4183, 111th Cong. (2009); see Shelton, supra note 5, at 15. 
96 See H.R. 4135: Keep Americans Working Act, GovTrack.us, http://www.govtrack.us/ 
congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-4135 (last visited May 18, 2012); H.R. 4183: Helping Unemployed 
Workers Act, GovTrack.us, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-4183 (last 
visited May 18, 2012); S. 1646: Keep Americans Working Act, GovTrack.us, http://www.gov 
track.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-1646 (last visited May 18, 2012); S. 2831: Helping Unem-
ployed Workers Act, GovTra
t visited May 18, 2012). 
97 Letter from Barack Obama, U.S. President, to Congress (Sept. 12, 2011), in Th
rican Jobs Act: President Obama’s Plan to Create Jobs Now, para. 2. (2011). 
98 See Layoff Prevention Act, S. 1333, 112th Cong. (2011); Layoff Prevention Act, H.R. 
2421, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 2421: Layoff Prevention Act of 2011, GovTrack.us, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h112-2421 (last visited May 18, 2012); S. 
1333: Layoff Prevention Act of 2011, GovTrack.
?bill=s112-1333 (last visited May 18, 2012). 
99 See S. 1333; H.R. 2421; S. 2
, supra note 97, §§ 341–346. 
100 See S. 1333 § 2(a)(1); H.R. 2421 § 2(a)(1
101 S. 1333 § 2(a)(1); H.R. 2421 § 2(a)
102 S. 1333 §§ 3–5; H.R. 2421 §§ 3–5. 
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It provides DOL and states with funding to promote STC programs and 
requires DOL to offer model legislation and technical assistance.103 
States would receive reimbursement of STC payments from the federal 
government for up to three years under the LPA’s provisions.104 In ad-
dition, seasonal or temporary workers would not be eligible for pro-
gra wo 
d 
uctural adjustments, as efforts to save em-
                                                             
m participation.105 Finally, existing state plans would be given t
an a half years to comply with program requirements.106 
B. National Understanding of Work Sharing’s Proper Role and Benefits 
 Perhaps as a consequence of Germany’s clear legal mandate for 
Kurzarbeit, the program’s utility does not appear to be hampered by the 
widespread misunderstandings that afflict STC in the United States.107 
Germans understand that work sharing’s limitations are a function of 
the program’s purpose: to avoid layoffs by spreading the burden of 
temporary economic decline among more employees through de-
creased work hours.108 STC is an appropriate response only during an 
economic crisis of limited duration;109 it is generally not suitable for an 
exceedingly lengthy period of economic decline.110 It should not be 
used to avoid necessary str
ployees facing imminent layoffs would prove futile.111 Such was the case 
with the eventual loss of jobs following the use of work sharing during 
German reunification.112 
 The United States, with disjointed STC program authorization and 
enforcement, lacks a clear, widespread understanding of the benefits of 
STC programs and their potential role in easing unemployment during 
a recession.113 As an alternative to employee layoffs, STC can create a 
“win-win-win” situation for all parties.114 Employees directly benefit 
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112 See Crimmann et al., supra note 4, at 1
113 See Final Rep
114 Cris
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from STC by avoiding job loss and receiving supplemental income.115 
This allows employers to operate during the downturn and retain 
workers who will be needed once the economy recovers.116 Employers 
also benefit from lower costs because “the preservation of human capi-
tal”117 allows them to spend less on termination, hiring, and training.118 
Furthermore, because work sharing avoids laying off those with the 
least seniority by making cuts across the seniority spectrum, some have 
argued that “the average hourly wage rate would probably be lower.”119 
The government also benefits, as STC payments to a particular worker 
w ld be smaller than traditional unemployment compensation pay-
ments.
ou
erceive any advantage to employers.124 
 la
pel employers to 
                                                                                                                     
120 Finally, society as a whole benefits from the higher spirits of 
workers who have kept their jobs after facing the possibility of layoffs.121 
 Despite these benefits, some states and employers misunderstand 
STC’s unique advantages.122 For example, partial benefits under the 
traditional unemployment compensation scheme may seem to provide 
STC-like support; however, these funds are only available when workers 
collecting unemployment benefits make less in wages than their weekly 
unemployment allowance.123 States have also failed to implement STC 
programs because they do not p
A ck of manufacturing employers, consistent seasonal layoffs, and the 
prevalence of small businesses are reasons states have offered to explain 
STC’s perceived unsuitability.125 
 Four distinct apprehensions about STC plan costs may also affect 
program implementation in the United States.126 First, employers may 
worry about the increased costs associated with paying full retirement 
and health benefits.127 Although UCA does not com
 
115 Id. 
gh Work Sharing, Insight on Issues (AARP Pub. Policy 
Inst
hat STC disproportionately 
prot ung adults.”). 
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119 See, e.g., Vroman & Brusentsev, supra note 25, at 3–4. Some argue that work sharing 
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125 Id. at 4-15 to -16. 
126 See id. at 3-3 to -4. 
127 Shelton, supra
2012] Germany’s Kurzarbeit as a Model for U.S. Short Term Compensation 495 
p ide STC-participating employees with full retirement and health 
benefits, many state programs based on TEFRA’s earlier legislation re-
quire the continuation of such employer support.
rov
er wage 
tes
yment trust funds.134 This 
nc
claims under STC than there would be for traditional unemployment 
                                                                                                                     
128 
 Second, employers may be worried about increased costs in the 
form of larger unemployment insurance contributions.129 When STC 
programs were first established, states often required STC-participating 
employers to pay extra charges that increased their unemployment in-
surance tax rate.130 Apart from extra charges, employers might also 
face higher average unemployment insurance payments because, in 
addition to newer workers, longstanding employees with high
ra  would participate in STC programs.131 Because STC involves cut-
ting the hours of employees across the board in lieu of layoffs, benefits 
payments would be made to higher-wage workers with seniority.132 
 A third concern involves the duration of STC payments and their 
source of funding.133 If taxpayers believe the overall eligibility period 
for traditional unemployment benefits is unaffected by STC program 
participation, some might worry that workers will exploit both pro-
grams and thus unduly burden state unemplo
co ern amplifies the more fundamental worry that, regardless of pro-
gram duration, state unemployment trust funds will be unable to han-
dle the sheer number of STC claims filed.135 
 Finally, states have raised serious questions regarding the costs of 
STC administration.136 STC claims processing may cost more than tra-
ditional unemployment claims administration, because approval of 
STC plans is non-automated and granted on an individual basis.137 Be-
cause STC is a way to spread the burden of less work among more peo-
ple, it may also increase the administrative burden on states.138 Pre-
sumably more workers would participate in STC than would apply for 
unemployment benefits after being laid off; thus, there would be more 
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compensation.139 Additionally, more employees would be eligible for 
STC benefits than traditional unemployment benefits because “newer 
workers, who are more vulnerable in layoffs, are more likely to fail re-
quirem
d the 
rug
ms; indeed, a survey conducted in the mid-1990s 
un
                                                                                                                     
ents for regular unemployment benefits.”140 
C. Government Promotion and Public Awareness of Work Sharing 
 The fact that Kurzarbeit was used by more than 1.4 million workers 
and 63,000 employers during the recession is evidence of the German 
federal government’s successful efforts to promote the program to state 
governments and the general public.141 Although program use reached 
unprecedented levels during the 2008–2009 recession, “the extensive 
use of work sharing [was] not new for Germany.”142 Work sharing was 
used in the 1990s to temper job loss during reunification and to ai
st gling auto industry.143 Furthermore, in the pre-recession months 
of early 2007, thousands of workers participated in Kurzarbeit.144 
 In contrast, the inconsistent and uncertain relationship between 
federal law and state STC programs has left U.S. employers and workers 
generally unaware—or worse, skeptical—of these schemes.145 DOL has 
been reticent in promoting STC programs and providing guidance to 
states seeking to establish or expand programs.146 Before the 2008 re-
cession, STC benefits rarely exceeded 1% of all unemployment bene-
fits.147 In fact, most of the states that currently offer STC programs “do 
not actively promote STC.”148 State officials may not be knowledgeable 
about the progra
fo d that three states’ unemployment insurance officials “had not 
heard of STC.”149 
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141 See Messenger, supra note 108, at 3; Crisis 
142 See Crimmann et
143 See id. at 15, 1
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 Limited funding can also hinder adequate STC program promo-
tion.150 In the past, STC marketing has been as minimal as summariz-
ing the program in regular employer-targeted unemployment materials 
or engaging in limited leaflet distribution.151 Because STC use is so lim-
ited, it has failed to garner onal attention as a feasible 
solution to temporary unemployment.152 
on-
ip
 programs in favor of LPA’s more TEFRA-based 
ov
in states with TEFRA-based programs are already familiar with such a 
                                                                                                                     
significant nati
III. Analysis 
A. Enact Federal Legislation Consistent with Existing State Programs 
 To make better use of STC programs, the United States should 
follow Germany’s lead and provide a clear and consistent authorization 
for these schemes.153 Although UCA provides a permanent federal STC 
policy that allows all states to implement STC programs, the relati
sh  between existing state plans and federal legislation is disjointed.154 
New legislation like LPA is thus needed to amend or repeal UCA in fa-
vor of provisions that do not conflict with current STC programs.155 
  Congress should reconcile federal law and existing state programs 
by reinstating some of TEFRA’s original provisions.156 Because many 
state programs were created under TEFRA, legislators should abandon 
UCA’s definition of STC
pr isions.157 This would avoid the significant modifications that would 
have to be made to states’ current STC programs to bring them into 
compliance with UCA. 
 New legislation should require that employers continue to con-
tribute to the health insurance and pension plans of STC-participating 
workers.158 Although this proposal may seem controversial, employers 
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mandate.159 In fact, many employers have chosen to provide STC-
participating workers with full benefits even though it is not required 
 la
 states already familiar with them.164 If im-
 of “political urgency,” 
e 
plans to state agencies, obtain union consent, and continue contribut-
                                                                                                                     
by w.160 Surveys reveal that few employers considered these continued 
benefit contributions to be a significant drawback of STC.161 
 STC legislation should also incorporate TEFRA’s requirements 
that employers submit written STC plans to state agencies and obtain 
union consent when appropriate.162 These conditions not only secure 
government and employee approval, but increase transparency by mak-
ing information about STC more available.163 Because many states cre-
ated STC programs under TEFRA’s mandate, these provisions would be 
relatively uncontroversial in
plemented, these requirements would mirror Kurzarbeit’s notification 
and approval provisions.165 
 Reconciliation of TEFRA and UCA should be achieved through 
legislation because the problem cannot be solved by DOL action 
alone.166 If the ultimate goal is to conform federal law to fit existing 
TEFRA-based programs, DOL can do little more than broaden its inter-
pretation of UCA to permit existing programs.167 Although such action 
might draw STC into public discourse as a matter
th fact remains that only Congress can make the necessary legal 
changes to solve the problem once and for all.168 
 The need for a legislative response is evident from past Congres-
sional attempts to incorporate TEFRA provisions into UCA’s current 
framework.169 During recessionary periods since the 1990s, members of 
Congress have repeatedly introduced bills to reconcile state programs 
with federal law by mandating that STC-participating employers submit 
 
al Report, supra note 47, at 3-15. 
ention 
Act lton, supra note 5, at 11–12. 
)(1). 
istry of Labour & Soc. Affairs, supra note 32, at 8; Crimmann et al., 
supr
. The legal controversy, however, would likely 
still
 Wandner, supra note 60, at 129–30. 
ra note 5, at 13. 
159 See id. 
160 See Fin
161 See id. 
162 See Layoff Prevention Act, S. 1333 § 2(a)(1), 112th Cong. (2011); Layoff Prev
, H.R. 2421 § 2(a)(1), 112th Cong. (2011); She
163 See S. 1333 § 2(a)(1); H.R. 2421 § 2(a
164 See Shelton, supra note 5, at 11–12. 
165 See Fed. Min
a note 4, at 13. 
166 See Balducchi & Wandner, supra note 60, at 129. 
167 See id. Congress could give the DOL the power “to determine what provisions are 
appropriate for the work sharing program beyond the five that are now in permanent 
federal law.” Id.; see Ridley, supra note 67, at 3
 remain. See Shelton, supra note 5, at 13. 
168 See Messenger, supra note 108, at 6; Balducchi &
169 See Shelton, sup
2012] Germany’s Kurzarbeit as a Model for U.S. Short Term Compensation 499 
ing to retirement and health plans.170 Although bills introduced in 2009 
died in committee,171 Congress has another chance to realign federal 
STC legislation with the introduction of LPA in 2011.172 LPA proposes 
not only to incorporate TEFRA’s requirements, but also to further re-
fine STC’s scope and provide the funding and support needed to prop-
erly promote and implement STC.173 
B. Improve National U ng’s Potential Role in 
 paying STC benefits and improving their 
programs’ administration.178 
. E
                                                                                                                     
nderstanding of Work Shari
Combating Unemployment 
 To optimize STC use, Congress should enact legislation that evinces 
an understanding of STC’s proper role and addresses concerns about its 
potential costs.174 Federal authorization must make clear that STC is a 
program complementary to traditional unemployment benefits and 
useful to all types of employers facing temporary layoffs.175 If properly 
structured and implemented, the program would ease fears about costs 
associated with continued retirement and health benefits, unemploy-
ment insurance contributions, and the duration of STC benefits.176 In 
fact, employers could experience a decrease in some costs.177 Finally, 
Congressional authorization of temporary federal funding could lessen 
the financial burden on states
1 nsure Understanding of STC’s Appropriate Scope 
 A clear understanding of the appropriateness of STC programs is 
as essential to program success as a consistent legal framework.179 To 
ensure that state governments and individuals appreciate the role STC 
can play in combating unemployment, it must be widely known that as 
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a work sharing program, STC has a limited purpose: to avoid layoffs 
during temporary periods of economic decline.180 It should not be 
used to avoid layoffs during more permanent periods of decline or to 
oi
ers are not eligible for STC programs that 
ce
 is critical that STC legislation is 
crafted to avoid program misuse.190 
                                                            
av d necessary structural changes.181 
 A strong legislative framework can make STC’s scope clear.182 For 
example, STC’s appropriateness as a response to temporary periods of 
economic decline can be supported by legislative provisions that pro-
vide benefits for a discrete period of time.183 Recognizing states’ needs 
for funding in the current economic climate, LPA offers STC benefit 
reimbursement to states, but only within the three-and-a-half years fol-
lowing enactment.184 LPA also defines the proper scope of STC pro-
grams by prohibiting the participation of workers who might attempt to 
use the program on a more permanent basis.185 “[S]easonal, tempo-
rary, or intermittent” work
re ive federal funding.186 
 Crafting a federal law that clearly establishes STC’s limited role in 
the United States is important because STC must distinguish itself from 
Kurzarbeit in at least one regard. In some circumstances, Kurzarbeit has 
been used to respond to permanent structural changes or as a transi-
tional program with a worker training component.187 In the United 
States, however, where STC is underutilized and relatively unknown, 
these uses not only distort STC’s primary purpose in avoiding layoffs 
during temporary periods of decline, but they would cause needless 
confusion to those unfamiliar with STC.188 Furthermore, STC skeptics 
concerned about the program’s impact on state unemployment trust 
funds may fear that, if the program is used to address more permanent 
redundancies, it might require extension of the eligibility period for 
unemployment benefits.189 Thus, it
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 Although STC’s limited application makes it “unlikely to ever play 
a great role in the unemployment compensation system,”191 the pro-
gram must nonetheless be promoted to all types of employers.192 The 
United States should follow Germany’s lead in endorsing STC’s useful-
ness to employers in all industries and of all sizes—not just those in 
manufacturing.193 
 Congress, DOL, and state governments must also make clear to 
employers and employees that STC will supplement, not supplant, more 
traditional unemployment benefits schemes.194 Just as Germany main-
tains its own separate support program for unemployed workers while 
successfully utilizing Kurzarbeit, so too can the United States maintain 
traditional unemployment benefits while making better use of STC.195 
Instead of providing laid-off employees with only 50% of their working 
wages, the United States can ensure that STC-participating employees 
facing significant working hour cutbacks can remain employed and con-
tinue to receive the majority of their normal working wages.196 
 For example, a worker facing a 50% cut in hours could expect to 
receive only a 25% decrease in income under the program, because the 
employer would provide 50% of normal compensation due to hours 
worked and the government would provide an additional 25% of in-
come in STC benefits.197 If an STC scheme were not implemented, the 
worker would not receive an additional 25% supplemental income ben-
efit under the traditional unemployment insurance program.198 Fur-
thermore, unemployment insurance’s partial benefits would not apply 
because they are only available when workers collecting unemployment 
                                                                                                                      
participating in training or conducting job searches,” id. at 8-12, this change in “STC’s 
purpose . . . from layoff prevention to employment transition,” id., is by no means clearly 
warranted or broadly desired. See id. at 8-13 to -14. 
191 See Shelton, supra note 5, at 16. 
192 See Fed. Ministry of Labour & Soc. Affairs, supra note 32, at 7. 
193 See Fed. Ministry of Labour & Soc. Affairs, supra note 32, at 7; Crimmann et al., 
supra note 4, at 10. 
194 See Shelton, supra note 5, at 3; Final Report, supra note 47, at 4-8. 
195 See Shelton, supra note 5, at 3; Crisis to Recovery, supra note 1, at 17 (describing 
Germany’s spending on unemployment claims during the recession). Germany’s labor 
market schemes do not render the role of STC and traditional unemployment benefits 
mutually exclusive; Kurzarbeit allows for payment of benefits not only while an employee is 
working reduced hours, but also when that employee’s hours have been totally cut to zero. 
See Crimmann et al., supra note 4, at 13 (noting that workers using Kurzarbeit can receive 
benefits comparable to traditional unemployment benefits, although the workers are con-
sidered legally “employed”). 
196 See Shelton, supra note 5, at 2–3 (describing how STC functions). 
197 See id. 
198 See id. at 3 (explaining the role of partial benefits). 
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benefits earn less than their weekly unemployment compensation al-
lowance.199 Thus, in a period of temporary decline, workers facing a 
decrease in income would receive greater financial benefit from partici-
pating in STC than being laid off and collecting traditional unemploy-
ment benefits.200 
. A
nd have not been 
ons
                                                                                                                     
2 ddress Concerns About Program Costs 
 In addition to explaining STC’s proper role, Congress, DOL, and 
state governments must address concerns about STC costs.201 The gov-
ernment should emphasize that STC can actually lower some costs for 
employers, including termination, rehiring, and training expenses.202 
Further, to allay concerns about continued retirement and health ben-
efit contributions, the government should note that such payments are 
already required by TEFRA-based state programs, a
c idered significant drawbacks of program use.203 
 STC-participating employers must understand that they will not be 
overburdened by significantly greater unemployment insurance contri-
butions.204 Regardless of whether Germany’s Kurzarbeit framework 
treats STC and traditional unemployment benefits the same for pur-
poses of social insurance contributions, past U.S. experience with STC 
should ease employer concerns.205 Many states with STC programs no 
longer distinguish between STC and traditional unemployment bene-
fits when setting employer contribution levels.206 Unless Congress 
amends federal law to determine contributions for both programs un-
der different rubrics, states enacting STC programs can treat employer 
 
 Brusentsev, supra note 25, at 4. 
supra note 47, at 3-3 to -4, 8-2. 
 significant role in the discus-
sion
, impose additional taxes on employers participating in STC. 
She
199 See id. 
200 See id. 
201 See Final Report, supra note 47, at 3-3 to -4, 8-2. 
202 See Crisis to Recovery, supra note 1, at 34; Vroman &
203 See Final Report, 
204 See id. at 3-5, 4-24. 
205 See id. Because Germany’s social insurance framework is more extensive than U.S. 
social insurance schemes, likely reflecting broader ideological differences between the two 
countries, a sufficient comparison of social insurance systems would require exploration 
beyond this Note’s scope. See Final Report, supra note 47, at 3-5 to -7 (contrasting U.S. 
reliance on layoffs with more robust responses in Germany and other European coun-
tries); Weiss & Schmidt, supra note 45, at 19 (“[Germany’s federal republic] is based on 
. . . the principle of welfare improvement . . . which plays a
 of labour law and of social security law.”). 
206 Final Report, supra note 47, at 3-5, 4-24; Vroman & Brusentsev, supra note 25, at 
17. Seven states do, however
lton, supra note 5, at 3. 
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use of STC and traditional unemployment benefits the same.207 In fact, 
LPA would not use employer-paid portions of STC benefits under a 
federal-state STC agreement “for purposes of calculating an employer’s 
nt
ly the jobs needed 
nce
     
co ribution rate.”208 
 Such treatment of STC and traditional unemployment benefit 
contributions could even lessen the burden on STC-participating em-
ployers.209 Because STC payments to a particular worker would likely be 
less than traditional unemployment benefits,210 employers’ resulting 
contributions to the state’s unemployment trust fund would not in-
crease with the implementation of STC.211 Although one commentator 
speculates that significantly increased STC use could strain the unem-
ployment trust fund, STC’s limited utility in saving on
o  the economy improves could offset this fear.212 
 To strengthen an understanding of STC in the United States, Con-
gress, DOL, and state governments must also explain that STC does not 
increase costs by extending the overall unemployment benefit eligibility 
period.213 Because STC program participation counts against the tradi-
tional unemployment benefits period, it does not provide additional 
weeks of compensation that could drain state unemployment trust 
funds.214 LPA confirms this in its proposal to limit explicitly program 
funding to the twenty-six week period normally allowed for unemploy-
ment benefits.215 Although U.S. STC programs differ from Kurzarbeit in 
                                                                                                                 
207 See Final Report, supra note 47, at 3-5, 4-24; Shelton, supra note 5, at 3. 
208 S. 1333 § 4(b)(3); H.R. 2421 § 4(b)(3). STC agreements, as distinguished from STC 
programs, may be entered into by states without laws “provid[ing] for the payment of short-
time  compensation program.” S. 1333 § 4(a)(1); H.R. 
2421
rship, supra note 77, at 10 (“[Experience rating] 
form ith un-
emp
 Outlook: Germany, supra note 2, at 1 (“[E]stimates . . . sug-
gest ould have been maintained even 
in th
 compensation under a short-time
 § 4(a)(1). 
209 See Shelton, supra note 5, at 3. 
210 See id. (explaining that workers with working hour reductions as low as 10% can 
participate in STC, whereas unemployment benefits supplement up to 50% of wages). 
211 See id.; Federal-State Partne
ulas are devised to establish the relative experience of individual employers w
loyment or with benefit costs.”). 
212 See Crimmann et al., supra note 4, at 13; Final Report, supra note 47, at 8-7. 
213 Vroman & Brusentsev, supra note 25, at 4. 
214 See id. at 4. This argument does not address whether STC could be an extra burden 
on the Unemployment Trust Fund due to STC use by workers who would not otherwise 
collect traditional unemployment benefits. Because STC is only intended to be used to 
avoid layoffs during temporary periods of economic decline, in theory the only workers 
who would participate in the program would be those otherwise needing full unemploy-
ment benefits. But cf. Employment
[] that Kurzarbeit ends up supporting some jobs that w
e absence of the subsidy.”). 
215 See S. 1333 § 3(a)(3)(A); H.R. 2421 § 3(a)(3)(A). 
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this respect,216 counting STC participation against the unemployment 
benefits period is likely better suited to the current condition of the U.S. 
ould dis-
pr
 play a significant role in encouraging the appropri-
e u
                                                                                                                     
economy.217 
 In light of the fact that many states “ha[d] trusts funds that [were] 
barely solvent” during the recession, Congress should authorize federal 
funding to help states pay STC benefits.218 If Congress were to pass 
LPA, it would repay states with legally authorized STC programs 100% 
of STC benefit payments made for up to three years.219 Such temporary 
federal funding could alleviate concerns about STC’s potential burden 
on states and thus make Americans and states more amenable to STC 
program expansion.220 Because STC is not yet a topic of national dis-
course, however, authorization of federal funding to expand STC would 
likely face significant opposition.221 With a number of states and indi-
viduals unsure of STC’s appropriateness and concerned about the pro-
gram’s costs, it is reasonable to assume that many taxpayers w
ap ove or be skeptical of a federally funded STC initiative.222 
 Nonetheless, even if there is not adequate support for a tempo-
rary, comprehensive, federally funded STC program, more modest 
goals could be achieved with federal support. Federal funding could 
drive DOL’s efforts to provide states with better technical assistance, 
marketing strategies, and administrative procedures.223 For example, 
LPA would allow DOL a portion of available funds “to provide for out-
reach and to share best practices.”224 If these efforts were properly 
funded, they could
at se of STC.225 
 Comprehensive efforts to encourage STC use in the United Sates 
would also require states to make improvements to existing STC frame-
works.226 Program administration is one area in which both Germany 
 
noting the serious impact the recession had 
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 Wandner, supra note 60, at 128. 
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(e); H.R. 2421 § 5(e). 
216 Vroman & Brusentsev, supra note 25, at 13. STC use in Germany does not impact 
the eligibility period for full unemployment benefits. Id. 
217 See Ridley, supra note 67, at 3–4, 5 n.5 (
tate unemployment trust funds); Vroman & Brusentsev, supra note 25
218 See Ridley, supra note 67, at 3–4, 5
219 See S. 1333 § 3(a)(1), (b)(2); H.R. 2421 § 3(a)(1)
220 See Ridley, supra note 67, at 3–4. 
221 See Balducchi &
222 See Final Report, supra note 47, at 3
223 See id. at 4-45. 
224 See S. 1333 § 5
225 See Final Report, supra note 47, at 4-45. 
226 See id. at 8-8. 
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and the United States have shown a need for improvement.227 Just as 
Germany streamlined its application process to facilitate approval of 
Kurzarbeit participation, so too must the United States consider ways to 
ease the administrative burden of STC program implementation and 
operation.228 One measure that could ease significant concerns about 
STC administration costs is to permit employers to file STC claims.229 
Because STC increases the number of employees filing for unemploy-
ment compensation, requiring employers, instead of employees, to file 
o greater than 
those of traditional unemployment programs.235 Recognizing the need 
for updated STC tates with grants 
 im
appropriate use, should support efforts to increase STC awareness.237 
                                                                                                                     
workers’ claims would ease the burden on state employment agen-
cies.230 With employer-filed claims, states could avoid an onslaught of 
workers individually approaching the agency for approval.231 
 Germany’s administrative improvements should also encourage 
the United States to mechanize claims processing and streamline pro-
gram approval.232 Automating the claims filing system would allow 
states to handle better the increased claims that accompany STC par-
ticipation.233 Streamlining the authorization process would allow states 
to avoid “the layers of approval” that hinder plan submissions and pro-
gram implementation.234 States seeking enhanced program administra-
tion systems could expect STC administrative costs n
administration, LPA would provide s
to prove processes for filing STC plans and claims.236 
C. Increase Awareness of STC Programs 
 Federal legislation, in addition to authorizing clearly STC and its 
 
r & Soc. Affairs, supra note 32, at 8; Final Report, 
supr  at 8-8. 
 claims, usually filed 
ever nly employers, instead of individual employees, to 
verif ith a signature. See Final Report, supra note 47, at 8-4. 
on, supra note 5, at 7. 
 See S. 1333 § 5(a), (d)(3); H.R. 2421 § 5(a), (d)(3). 
 note 60, at 
128. 
227 See Fed. Ministry of Labour & Soc. Affairs, supra note 32, at 8; Final Report, 
supra note 47, at 8-8. 
228 See Fed. Ministry of Labou
a note 47,
229 Shelton, supra note 5, at 7. 
230 See id. 
231 See id. Some states also eased the burden associated with filing
y week or two weeks, by requiring o
y claims w
232 See Shelt
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235 See Final Report, supra note 47, at 8-3 to -4. 
236
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Lacking Germany’s more robust history of work sharing,238 the United 
States must actively promote the benefits of STC to its states and citi-
ns
mote STC without fearing any conflict, and could 
ng
egislation that “allow[s] suffi-
en
                                                                                                                     
ze .239 Underutilization of work sharing can be tackled only if a na-
tional discourse on STC programs is established.240 
 Most fundamentally, DOL should actively endorse STC.241 Al-
though Congressional action is more desirable than DOL’s action alone, 
DOL’s promotion of STC programs could provide the spark that makes 
STC an issue of pressing national concern.242 DOL is already legally au-
thorized to endorse STC in states without programs and support states’ 
efforts to publicize established programs.243 If such DOL action eventu-
ally prompts Congress to reconcile STC policy at the state and federal 
levels, DOL could pro
si ularly focus on reaching a level of program awareness similar to that 
found in Germany.244 
 To promote STC, DOL should create model legislation for states 
to follow in crafting their own STC programs.245 Although Germany’s 
governmental structure merely requires states to implement federal 
law,246 the United States must provide legislative guidance to address 
adequately the freedom its own system gives to states constructing un-
employment compensation programs.247 If enacted, LPA would require 
the Secretary of Labor to create model l
ci t flexibility by States and participating employers while ensuring 
accountability and program integrity.”248 
 UCA required DOL to produce model legislation in early 1993, 
but DOL has not yet done so.249 DOL’s unwillingness to provide model 
legislation until federal and state policy are reconciled is understand-
able, because promoting STC could put existing TEFRA-based state 
 
2; Crimmann et al., supra note 4, at 17. 
andner, supra note 60, at 128. 
t 128–30. 
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240 See Balducchi & W
241 See id. a
242 See id. 
243 See id. at 130. 
244 See id. at 128–29.
245 See id. at 128. 
246 See Weiss & Schmidt, supra note 45, at 19. 
247 See Feder
e 60, at 128. 
248 S. 1333 § 6(b); H.R. 2421 § 6(b). The Act would also require the Secretary of Labor 
to “consult with employers, labor organizations, State workforce agencies,
 experts” in creating such guidance. S. 1333 § 6(
249 Balducchi & Wandner, supra note
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programs at risk.250 Nonetheless, DOL should be concerned about the 
lack of legal guidance for states and be prepared to issue model legisla-
tion once a consistent federal and state framework is established.251 If 
states do not have clear guidance from DOL, it is unlikely that work 
ar
ion.259 These types of renewed DOL 
for
                                                                                                                     
sh ing implementation in the United States would reach even a frac-
tion of that found in Germany.252 
 DOL must also promote STC by providing technical assistance for 
STC program implementation.253 Like the unreleased model legislation, 
DOL did not make technical assistance and support available after UCA 
was enacted.254 While states with established STC initiatives may not 
need further technical assistance to construct their programs,255 they 
could still benefit from DOL’s more updated guidance.256 States imple-
menting programs for the first time could also benefit.257 LPA recog-
nizes this need by requiring DOL to “provide technical assistance and 
guidance in developing, enacting, and implementing such pro-
grams.”258 Specifically, DOL could assist states by organizing educational 
conferences, compiling a best practices manual, or creating an online 
forum with STC-related informat
ef ts could address the stagnation of STC program establishment that 
occurred after UCA’s enactment.260 
 DOL should also support the efforts of state governments in pro-
moting STC to the labor community.261 Efforts to encourage employer 
and worker awareness would be especially effective if DOL and state 
governments connected with unions and business associations.262 For 
instance, DOL could engage in various marketing and outreach efforts 
to target the labor community in a particular area and report its efforts 
back to the states.263 Contact with unions and business associations 
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259 See Final Report, supra note 47, at 8-10 to -11; Ridley, supra note 67, at 3. 
260 See Ridley, supra note 67, at 3. 
261 See id. 
262 Id. 
263 See Final Report, supra note 47, at 8-10. 
508 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 35:481 
would ensure that these crucial players are aware of STC programs, and 
make it more likely that individual workers and employers are similarly 
informed.264 Because the United States has not enjoyed an STC history 
as extensive and robust as Germany’s history with Kurzarbeit,265 the Unit-
d S
romote STC.”270 More robust marketing 
efforts at the state level would increase program awareness and lead to 
ultimately greater STC use.271
nited States should contemplate Germany’s success with 
rz
                                                                                                                     
e tates must undertake these additional efforts to inform the labor 
community of STC opportunities.266 
 Finally, DOL could support states’ promotion efforts by endorsing 
innovative or effective state practices.267 It could recommend Rhode 
Island’s operation of “rapid response team[s]” to explain the benefits of 
STC in the face of significant layoffs, or it could recommend New York’s 
use of press conferences to promote STC.268 Some legislators found 
such tactics so useful that, if enacted, LPA would authorize grant dis-
bursement to states that use “rapid response teams . . . [and] provi[de] 
education or assistance to employers to enable them to assess the feasi-
bility of participating in [STC].”269 By promoting STC to the states in 
these ways, DOL could remedy the unfortunate situation in which 
“[m]ost states do not actively p
 
Conclusion 
 Germany’s success with Kurzarbeit during the recent recession has 
directed needed attention to work sharing programs and their poten-
tial role in combating unemployment. In the United States, STC could 
be an appropriate and effective response to the layoffs that accompany 
a recession. Although the United States has its own history of STC use, 
a host of issues prevent STC from being properly utilized by states. 
Thus, the U
Ku arbeit and discern areas for improvement in its own STC policy and 
legislation. 
 
264 See id. at 4-43. Through the various measures described above, the DOL could reach 
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agency, legislators, . . . labor groups, or the governor.” See id. 
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266 See Ridley, supra note 67, at 3. 
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268 See Ridley, supra note 67, at 3. 
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ore thoughtful dia-
gu
y’s success with Kurzarbeit can inform a reas-
sessment of U.S. STC policy, STC will be useful in combating U.S. un-
employment only when appropriate Congressional action converges 
with public awareness. 
 Most fundamentally, the United States needs a consistent legal 
framework upon which DOL and states can act regarding STC. Con-
gress needs to reconcile established state STC programs and federal law 
by changing UCA to incorporate TEFRA provisions. If Congress were to 
enact a framework like LPA, it could initiate a m
lo e to address widespread misunderstandings of STC. With a clear 
vision of STC’s proper role, the government could offer comprehensive 
guidance, funding, and support for STC programs. 
 Although German
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